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Private Equity Promised Better Healthcare. What Should Lawyers Learn From What Happened? 3

Before the legal profession becomes too enthusiastic about private equity investment and management services organizations, I’d suggest we take a serious look at another profession that has been living with these arrangements for years.

Healthcare.

Private equity firms have invested substantial amounts of money in physician practices, hospitals, specialty medical groups, and other healthcare businesses. The transactions have often been accompanied by familiar promises. More efficient operations. Better technology. Improved management. Additional resources for professionals who would rather concentrate on their patients than spend their days running a business.

If you’ve been following the discussion about private equity’s growing interest in law firms, those promises should sound awfully familiar.

I don’t dismiss them. Doctors, like lawyers, spend years developing professional skills without necessarily receiving much training in business management. A talented physician may be an excellent diagnostician and a terrible administrator. The same is true of an outstanding trial lawyer who has little interest in accounting, marketing, technology, or managing hundreds of employees.

Outside investment can help address those problems. But after watching what has happened in healthcare, I think lawyers should be asking a question that doesn’t receive nearly enough attention in the excitement surrounding these transactions.

Has the patient actually benefited?

It’s a question worth considering because private equity’s economic case for investing in professional services is relatively straightforward. Investors identify businesses that can become more valuable through consolidation, improved management, increased revenue, or reduced operating costs. They acquire or finance operations, introduce systems designed to improve financial performance, and eventually seek a return on their investment.

In healthcare, management services organizations have been one mechanism for separating medical decision-making from the business operations that support it. The physician practice remains responsible for providing medical care, while another company may handle administrative services, technology, billing, staffing, and other nonclinical functions.

The legal profession is now exploring a similar structure, with lawyers retaining ownership of their practices while outside investors participate in the economics of separately owned management businesses.

On paper, these arrangements can look quite sensible.

But we should be careful not to confuse making a business more profitable with making its services better or more affordable for the people who depend on them.

There’s research that should give us reason to ask harder questions. A study published in “JAMA Health Forum” examined physician practices in dermatology, gastroenterology, and ophthalmology that were acquired by private equity firms. Compared with similar practices that weren’t acquired, the private equity-backed practices experienced an average increase of approximately 11% in the amounts paid per claim during the period studied. They also saw increases in patient volume.

From an investor’s perspective, those findings could suggest a more productive and financially successful business. More patients, more services, and higher payments can certainly improve revenue.

But what do those numbers tell us about the patient’s experience?

Another study examining private equity acquisitions of gastroenterology practices found higher prices for colonoscopies without corresponding improvements in measured quality. That doesn’t establish that every private equity investment harms patients. The evidence varies across medical specialties and types of healthcare organizations, and some studies have found little meaningful change in particular patient outcomes.

Still, these findings raise an uncomfortable question. If the economic benefits of consolidation and professional management are so substantial, why aren’t patients consistently seeing those benefits in the form of lower prices or demonstrably better care?

I also find it interesting that Americans continue to struggle with rising healthcare and insurance costs despite years of investment, consolidation, and efforts to improve efficiency. To be clear, private equity isn’t responsible for every increase in medical spending or insurance premiums. Healthcare costs reflect a complicated combination of factors, many of which have little to do with private investment in medical practices.

But the continued rise in costs should make us skeptical of any suggestion that financial optimization necessarily benefits the people purchasing the service.

And that’s where the lesson for law firms begins.

Imagine a successful personal injury practice entering into an MSO arrangement that gives outside investors a substantial economic interest in the administrative business supporting the firm. The investors may promise better technology, centralized operations, more sophisticated advertising, and improved financial management.

Some of those improvements could genuinely help clients. A better case-management system might make communication easier. Additional staffing could allow lawyers to provide more responsive service. Improved financial resources might permit a firm to pursue complicated litigation that it otherwise couldn’t afford.

Those are real possibilities, and the profession shouldn’t reject them simply because investors expect to make money.

But what happens when management begins measuring success through the same kinds of metrics that dominate other commercial businesses?

How many prospective clients contacted the firm? What percentage signed representation agreements? How much revenue did different categories of cases produce? How long did matters remain open? Which cases required the greatest investment of attorney time and litigation expenses?

Those numbers can help a firm understand its operations. I’ve run a law practice long enough to know that ignoring financial performance isn’t a viable business strategy.

But they’re not a complete measure of whether the firm is doing its job well.

A difficult case may require substantial resources and years of litigation before producing any recovery. A seriously injured client may need more attention than a financial model anticipated. An attorney may reasonably recommend rejecting a settlement offer because the client’s interests would be better served by continuing the litigation.

None of those decisions necessarily makes the firm more efficient in the short term.

Yet each may be precisely what responsible legal representation requires.

This is where I see a parallel with medicine. A physician may need to spend additional time with a complicated patient, order further testing, or recommend treatment that doesn’t fit neatly into a system designed around throughput and operating margins. Similarly, a lawyer may need to devote substantial resources to a difficult client matter even when the financial return is uncertain.

In both professions, the person receiving the service depends on the professional’s ability to make decisions based on individual needs rather than solely on business performance.

The challenge isn’t that profitability is inherently incompatible with professional responsibility. Doctors and lawyers have always needed to earn a living. Medical practices and law firms cannot function without adequate revenue, competent management, and financial discipline.

The challenge arises when the financial measurements begin to determine the professional decisions rather than support them.

And I think the experience of healthcare should make us particularly attentive to the distinction.

Consider what happens when a management organization centralizes staffing, billing, scheduling, and administrative services across several practices. Economies of scale may reduce operating costs, but whether those savings improve patient care depends on how they’re used. They might fund better equipment, additional clinicians, and improved access. They might also increase investor returns without producing a noticeable benefit for patients.

The same question applies to law firms. If a management organization reduces overhead by 20%, does that allow the firm to devote more resources to clients? Does it help attorneys accept cases they previously couldn’t afford to pursue? Does it improve communication, reduce delays, or make legal services more accessible?

Or does the financial benefit primarily flow to the owners of the management company?

There isn’t anything automatically improper about an investor earning a return on a legitimate business investment. The important question is whether the arrangement preserves the professional responsibilities that make law and medicine different from ordinary commercial enterprises.

There’s another lesson from healthcare that I believe deserves attention: consolidation can change the choices available to consumers.

When independent medical practices are acquired and combined into larger organizations, patients may find that their options have changed. The name on the office door may remain familiar, and the physician may continue seeing the same patients, but decisions about staffing, technology, billing, and business operations may increasingly be made elsewhere.

Law firms could experience something similar.

A community may continue seeing the names of familiar attorneys on advertisements and office signs while the businesses supporting those practices become concentrated among a relatively small number of investors and management organizations.

That doesn’t necessarily mean the lawyers lose their professional independence. But it raises important questions about competition, access, and whether the people seeking representation will enjoy more meaningful choices or simply encounter different brands supported by increasingly similar business structures.

I think that’s particularly relevant to personal injury law, where clients often have little experience choosing legal representation. Someone seriously injured in a crash may be making one of the most consequential decisions of their life under tremendous emotional and financial pressure. They deserve to know that the attorney handling their case is making decisions based on their interests, not on an investment platform’s preferred financial outcomes.

The profession should also be asking how we intend to measure the success of these arrangements.

If a private equity-backed management company doubles its revenue, expands into 10 new markets, and eventually sells for an enormous profit, the transaction may be an extraordinary financial success.

But what happened to the clients?

Were their cases handled more carefully? Did communication improve? Were complex claims given adequate resources? Did attorneys remain willing to take difficult cases involving people whose circumstances didn’t fit the most profitable business categories?

And perhaps most importantly, were the lawyers still making those decisions independently?

I don’t have a problem with innovation, and I’m certainly not suggesting that the traditional law firm business model is beyond criticism. Far from it. Legal services are expensive, many people struggle to obtain representation, and law firms can be inefficient organizations. We should welcome serious efforts to improve those conditions.

But we should demand evidence that the promised improvements actually reach the people the profession is supposed to serve.

Healthcare provides a useful warning because it demonstrates how easily a discussion about better management can become a discussion about financial performance. The two are related, but they’re not interchangeable. Higher revenue isn’t proof of better care. A more valuable business isn’t necessarily a more valuable service to the patient.

Lawyers would be making a serious mistake if we failed to learn that lesson before embracing similar arrangements on a much larger scale.

Private equity may bring money, technology, and sophisticated management to the legal profession. Some of those investments may improve the way lawyers practice and the experience of the people they represent.

But the success of these arrangements shouldn’t be measured exclusively by the size of the transaction, the growth of the management company, or the return earned by investors.

It should also be measured by what happens to the client.

After all, healthcare exists to serve patients, not simply to create valuable medical businesses. And law firms exist to serve clients, not merely to become attractive investment opportunities.

Before we celebrate what private equity can do for lawyers, perhaps we should ask what it intends to do for the people who hire them.


Michael J. Epstein, a Harvard Law School graduate, is a trial lawyer and managing partner of The Epstein Law Firm, P.A., a law firm based in New Jersey.

The post Private Equity Promised Better Healthcare. What Should Lawyers Learn From What Happened? appeared first on Above the Law.

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Private Equity Promised Better Healthcare. What Should Lawyers Learn From What Happened? 4

Before the legal profession becomes too enthusiastic about private equity investment and management services organizations, I’d suggest we take a serious look at another profession that has been living with these arrangements for years.

Healthcare.

Private equity firms have invested substantial amounts of money in physician practices, hospitals, specialty medical groups, and other healthcare businesses. The transactions have often been accompanied by familiar promises. More efficient operations. Better technology. Improved management. Additional resources for professionals who would rather concentrate on their patients than spend their days running a business.

If you’ve been following the discussion about private equity’s growing interest in law firms, those promises should sound awfully familiar.

I don’t dismiss them. Doctors, like lawyers, spend years developing professional skills without necessarily receiving much training in business management. A talented physician may be an excellent diagnostician and a terrible administrator. The same is true of an outstanding trial lawyer who has little interest in accounting, marketing, technology, or managing hundreds of employees.

Outside investment can help address those problems. But after watching what has happened in healthcare, I think lawyers should be asking a question that doesn’t receive nearly enough attention in the excitement surrounding these transactions.

Has the patient actually benefited?

It’s a question worth considering because private equity’s economic case for investing in professional services is relatively straightforward. Investors identify businesses that can become more valuable through consolidation, improved management, increased revenue, or reduced operating costs. They acquire or finance operations, introduce systems designed to improve financial performance, and eventually seek a return on their investment.

In healthcare, management services organizations have been one mechanism for separating medical decision-making from the business operations that support it. The physician practice remains responsible for providing medical care, while another company may handle administrative services, technology, billing, staffing, and other nonclinical functions.

The legal profession is now exploring a similar structure, with lawyers retaining ownership of their practices while outside investors participate in the economics of separately owned management businesses.

On paper, these arrangements can look quite sensible.

But we should be careful not to confuse making a business more profitable with making its services better or more affordable for the people who depend on them.

There’s research that should give us reason to ask harder questions. A study published in “JAMA Health Forum” examined physician practices in dermatology, gastroenterology, and ophthalmology that were acquired by private equity firms. Compared with similar practices that weren’t acquired, the private equity-backed practices experienced an average increase of approximately 11% in the amounts paid per claim during the period studied. They also saw increases in patient volume.

From an investor’s perspective, those findings could suggest a more productive and financially successful business. More patients, more services, and higher payments can certainly improve revenue.

But what do those numbers tell us about the patient’s experience?

Another study examining private equity acquisitions of gastroenterology practices found higher prices for colonoscopies without corresponding improvements in measured quality. That doesn’t establish that every private equity investment harms patients. The evidence varies across medical specialties and types of healthcare organizations, and some studies have found little meaningful change in particular patient outcomes.

Still, these findings raise an uncomfortable question. If the economic benefits of consolidation and professional management are so substantial, why aren’t patients consistently seeing those benefits in the form of lower prices or demonstrably better care?

I also find it interesting that Americans continue to struggle with rising healthcare and insurance costs despite years of investment, consolidation, and efforts to improve efficiency. To be clear, private equity isn’t responsible for every increase in medical spending or insurance premiums. Healthcare costs reflect a complicated combination of factors, many of which have little to do with private investment in medical practices.

But the continued rise in costs should make us skeptical of any suggestion that financial optimization necessarily benefits the people purchasing the service.

And that’s where the lesson for law firms begins.

Imagine a successful personal injury practice entering into an MSO arrangement that gives outside investors a substantial economic interest in the administrative business supporting the firm. The investors may promise better technology, centralized operations, more sophisticated advertising, and improved financial management.

Some of those improvements could genuinely help clients. A better case-management system might make communication easier. Additional staffing could allow lawyers to provide more responsive service. Improved financial resources might permit a firm to pursue complicated litigation that it otherwise couldn’t afford.

Those are real possibilities, and the profession shouldn’t reject them simply because investors expect to make money.

But what happens when management begins measuring success through the same kinds of metrics that dominate other commercial businesses?

How many prospective clients contacted the firm? What percentage signed representation agreements? How much revenue did different categories of cases produce? How long did matters remain open? Which cases required the greatest investment of attorney time and litigation expenses?

Those numbers can help a firm understand its operations. I’ve run a law practice long enough to know that ignoring financial performance isn’t a viable business strategy.

But they’re not a complete measure of whether the firm is doing its job well.

A difficult case may require substantial resources and years of litigation before producing any recovery. A seriously injured client may need more attention than a financial model anticipated. An attorney may reasonably recommend rejecting a settlement offer because the client’s interests would be better served by continuing the litigation.

None of those decisions necessarily makes the firm more efficient in the short term.

Yet each may be precisely what responsible legal representation requires.

This is where I see a parallel with medicine. A physician may need to spend additional time with a complicated patient, order further testing, or recommend treatment that doesn’t fit neatly into a system designed around throughput and operating margins. Similarly, a lawyer may need to devote substantial resources to a difficult client matter even when the financial return is uncertain.

In both professions, the person receiving the service depends on the professional’s ability to make decisions based on individual needs rather than solely on business performance.

The challenge isn’t that profitability is inherently incompatible with professional responsibility. Doctors and lawyers have always needed to earn a living. Medical practices and law firms cannot function without adequate revenue, competent management, and financial discipline.

The challenge arises when the financial measurements begin to determine the professional decisions rather than support them.

And I think the experience of healthcare should make us particularly attentive to the distinction.

Consider what happens when a management organization centralizes staffing, billing, scheduling, and administrative services across several practices. Economies of scale may reduce operating costs, but whether those savings improve patient care depends on how they’re used. They might fund better equipment, additional clinicians, and improved access. They might also increase investor returns without producing a noticeable benefit for patients.

The same question applies to law firms. If a management organization reduces overhead by 20%, does that allow the firm to devote more resources to clients? Does it help attorneys accept cases they previously couldn’t afford to pursue? Does it improve communication, reduce delays, or make legal services more accessible?

Or does the financial benefit primarily flow to the owners of the management company?

There isn’t anything automatically improper about an investor earning a return on a legitimate business investment. The important question is whether the arrangement preserves the professional responsibilities that make law and medicine different from ordinary commercial enterprises.

There’s another lesson from healthcare that I believe deserves attention: consolidation can change the choices available to consumers.

When independent medical practices are acquired and combined into larger organizations, patients may find that their options have changed. The name on the office door may remain familiar, and the physician may continue seeing the same patients, but decisions about staffing, technology, billing, and business operations may increasingly be made elsewhere.

Law firms could experience something similar.

A community may continue seeing the names of familiar attorneys on advertisements and office signs while the businesses supporting those practices become concentrated among a relatively small number of investors and management organizations.

That doesn’t necessarily mean the lawyers lose their professional independence. But it raises important questions about competition, access, and whether the people seeking representation will enjoy more meaningful choices or simply encounter different brands supported by increasingly similar business structures.

I think that’s particularly relevant to personal injury law, where clients often have little experience choosing legal representation. Someone seriously injured in a crash may be making one of the most consequential decisions of their life under tremendous emotional and financial pressure. They deserve to know that the attorney handling their case is making decisions based on their interests, not on an investment platform’s preferred financial outcomes.

The profession should also be asking how we intend to measure the success of these arrangements.

If a private equity-backed management company doubles its revenue, expands into 10 new markets, and eventually sells for an enormous profit, the transaction may be an extraordinary financial success.

But what happened to the clients?

Were their cases handled more carefully? Did communication improve? Were complex claims given adequate resources? Did attorneys remain willing to take difficult cases involving people whose circumstances didn’t fit the most profitable business categories?

And perhaps most importantly, were the lawyers still making those decisions independently?

I don’t have a problem with innovation, and I’m certainly not suggesting that the traditional law firm business model is beyond criticism. Far from it. Legal services are expensive, many people struggle to obtain representation, and law firms can be inefficient organizations. We should welcome serious efforts to improve those conditions.

But we should demand evidence that the promised improvements actually reach the people the profession is supposed to serve.

Healthcare provides a useful warning because it demonstrates how easily a discussion about better management can become a discussion about financial performance. The two are related, but they’re not interchangeable. Higher revenue isn’t proof of better care. A more valuable business isn’t necessarily a more valuable service to the patient.

Lawyers would be making a serious mistake if we failed to learn that lesson before embracing similar arrangements on a much larger scale.

Private equity may bring money, technology, and sophisticated management to the legal profession. Some of those investments may improve the way lawyers practice and the experience of the people they represent.

But the success of these arrangements shouldn’t be measured exclusively by the size of the transaction, the growth of the management company, or the return earned by investors.

It should also be measured by what happens to the client.

After all, healthcare exists to serve patients, not simply to create valuable medical businesses. And law firms exist to serve clients, not merely to become attractive investment opportunities.

Before we celebrate what private equity can do for lawyers, perhaps we should ask what it intends to do for the people who hire them.


Michael J. Epstein, a Harvard Law School graduate, is a trial lawyer and managing partner of The Epstein Law Firm, P.A., a law firm based in New Jersey.

The post Private Equity Promised Better Healthcare. What Should Lawyers Learn From What Happened? appeared first on Above the Law.