What do five Biden, two Obama, one George W. Bush, one Trump judicial appointee to the district courts have in common? If you guessed that they all issued significant injunctions, many at the national level in the last several weeks then you answered correctly. This post details the issues in the cases along with the scopes of the injunctions. It then delves into federal appeals opinions that in some way explicitly signaled a circuit split. Before jumping into the cases though here is a breakdown of current federal district court judges by party of appointing president (data from fjc.gov).
The split is approximately 54% Democratic to 46% Republican. When broken down by appointing president when senior judges are removed the balance is as follows:
These statistics are helpful in thinking about the district court judges who issued these injunctions and helps inform role politics may play not only in creating the policies that led to these cases, but potentially in the case dispositions as well. While these cases occur in a specific period of time, this relationship between judge and president is not static. Instead it works in both directions depending on the party of the active president and the party judge’s appointing president. Now for a look at each of the matters.
Injunctions
Talbott v. United States (DDC March 18, 2025)
Judge Ana Reyes (D. Biden)
What it’s about:
Talbott involves a legal challenge to President Donald Trump’s Executive Order 14183, which banned transgender individuals from serving in the U.S. military. The plaintiffs—active-duty transgender service members and enlistment candidates—argued that the policy violated their Fifth Amendment equal protection rights by discriminating against them based on sex and transgender status. They contended that the ban was rooted in animus, lacked a rational basis, and ignored evidence showing that transgender individuals could serve effectively. The government defended the policy by citing concerns about military readiness, unit cohesion, and costs, but the court found these justifications unsupported by credible evidence.
Outcome and Injunction:
Judge Reyes granted a preliminary injunction, blocking enforcement of the ban and maintaining the pre-existing policy allowing transgender individuals to serve openly. The injunction applies nationwide, preventing the military from discharging transgender service members or denying enlistment based on gender identity. The ruling emphasized that the government’s justifications were conjectural and pretextual, while the plaintiffs demonstrated irreparable harm to their careers and constitutional rights. The court stayed the injunction briefly to allow for a potential appeal but affirmed that upholding equal protection outweighs the government’s speculative claims about military effectiveness.
American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education v. McMahon (DMD 3/17/2025)
Judge Julie R. Rubin (D. Biden)
What it’s about:
This case involved the termination of federal grants under the Teacher Quality Partnership Program (TQP), Supporting Effective Educator Development Program (SEED), and Teacher and School Leader Incentive Program (TSL). The U.S. Department of Education terminated these grants, which supported teacher preparation and professional development, particularly in underserved areas, citing a shift in priorities away from diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives under Executive Order 14151. Plaintiffs, including the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education (AACTE), argued that the terminations violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because the Department failed to follow proper notice-and-comment rulemaking and provided vague reasoning.
Outcome and Injunction:
Judge Rubin issued a nationwide preliminary injunction, reinstating the terminated grants and prohibiting the Department from further terminations without following proper procedures. The injunction applied to all TQP, SEED, and TSL grant recipients, ensuring that the Department could not terminate these grants in a manner likely to violate the APA. The court emphasized that the Department’s failure to provide adequate notice and reasoning for the terminations rendered its actions arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The abrupt termination of grants caused irreparable harm to teacher preparation programs and the students they serve, particularly in underserved areas. The injunction highlights the importance of procedural safeguards in federal grant administration and underscores the judiciary’s role in ensuring that agencies adhere to statutory requirements. By reinstating the grants, the court preserved critical funding for programs that address teacher shortages and improve educational outcomes in disadvantaged communities.
Maryland v. United States Department of Agriculture (DMD 3/13/2025)
Judge James K. Bredar (D. Obama)
What it’s about:
This case arose from the federal government’s termination of thousands of probationary employees across multiple agencies in February 2025. Plaintiffs, including 19 states and the District of Columbia, argued that the terminations were illegal reductions in force (RIFs) conducted without the required 60-day notice to states, violating the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The terminations caused significant harm to states, including overwhelming unemployment systems and disrupting essential services.
Outcome and Injunction Analysis:
Judge Bredar granted a nationwide Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), reinstating the terminated employees and prohibiting further RIFs without proper notice. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits and that the states would suffer irreparable harm without the TRO. The court reasoned that the federal government’s failure to provide the required notice violated the APA and caused immediate harm to state unemployment systems and public services. The TRO not only reinstated the terminated employees but also prevented further disruptions to state operations. The nationwide scope of the injunction was necessary because the federal government’s actions were based on a uniform policy affecting all agencies and states. This case underscores the importance of procedural compliance in federal workforce reductions and the judiciary’s role in mitigating harm to state governments and their citizens.
Farmworker Association of Florida, Inc. v. James Uthmeier (SDFL 3/11/2025)
Judge Roy Altman (R. Trump)
What it’s about:
In this case the Farmworker Association challenged Section 10 of Florida’s SB 1718, which regulates the transportation of individuals who have entered the U.S. unlawfully. Plaintiffs, including the Farmworker Association of Florida (FWAF), argued that the state law was preempted by federal immigration law. The court granted a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of Section 10 but limited the injunction to the named plaintiffs and FWAF members.
Outcome and Injunction Analysis:
The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their preemption claim but declined to issue a statewide injunction, limiting relief to the individual plaintiffs and FWAF members. The court emphasized that equitable relief should be limited to parties who demonstrated standing. The injunction reflects the court’s cautious approach to balancing state and federal authority in immigration enforcement. By limiting the scope of the injunction, the court avoided a broader conflict with state sovereignty while still providing relief to the plaintiffs. This case highlights the ongoing tension between state immigration laws and federal preemption, as well as the judiciary’s role in navigating these complex legal issues.
National Association of Diversity Officers in Higher Education v. Trump (DMD 3/10/2025)
Judge Adam B. Abelson (D. Biden)
What it’s about:
This case involved a challenge to Executive Orders J20 and J21, which imposed restrictions on federal grants, contracts, and enforcement actions related to DEI programs. Plaintiffs argued that the orders violated the First Amendment (free speech) and the Fifth Amendment (due process).
Outcome and Injunction Analysis:
Judge Abelson granted a nationwide preliminary injunction, blocking enforcement of specific provisions of the orders. The injunction applied to all federal executive branch agencies, departments, and commissions directed by the orders. The court found that the orders were likely unconstitutional because they imposed content-based restrictions on speech and were unconstitutionally vague. The injunction underscores the judiciary’s role in protecting free speech and preventing government overreach in regulating DEI initiatives. By blocking the enforcement of the orders, the court preserved the ability of organizations to engage in DEI-related activities without fear of retaliation or loss of funding. This case highlights the broader debate over the role of DEI in public institutions and the limits of executive authority in shaping policy.
Massachusetts v. National Institutes of Health (DMA 3/5/2025)
Judge Angel Kelley (D. Biden)
What it’s about:
The NIH case deals with a Supplemental Guidance issued by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), which imposed a 15% cap on indirect cost rates for all NIH grants. Plaintiffs, including 22 state attorneys general and medical associations, argued that the cap violated federal law and threatened to disrupt biomedical research and public health initiatives.
Outcome and Injunction Analysis:
Judge Kelley granted a nationwide preliminary injunction, blocking enforcement of the Rate Change Notice. The injunction applied to all NIH grant recipients, not just the named plaintiffs. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claims and that the Rate Change Notice would cause irreparable harm to biomedical research and public health. The court emphasized that the NIH’s failure to follow proper procedures and consider the reliance interests of grant recipients rendered the Rate Change Notice arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The injunction preserves critical funding for research institutions and ensures the continuity of life-saving clinical trials and public health initiatives. This case highlights the importance of procedural compliance in federal rulemaking and the judiciary’s role in safeguarding public health and scientific research.
PFLAG, Inc. v. Trump (DMD 3/4/2025)
Judge Brendan A. Hurson (D. Biden)
What it’s about:
PFLAG challenged Executive Orders 14,168 (Gender Identity Order) and 14,187 (Healthcare Order), which conditioned federal funding on the denial of gender-affirming medical care for individuals under 19. Plaintiffs, including transgender minors and advocacy organizations, argued that the orders violated the separation of powers, conflicted with existing statutes, and infringed on equal protection rights.
Outcome and Injunction Analysis:
Judge Hurson granted a nationwide preliminary injunction, blocking enforcement of the challenged provisions. The injunction applied to all federal executive branch agencies. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claims and that the orders violated the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection clause. The injunction underscores the judiciary’s role in protecting the rights of marginalized communities and ensuring that federal policies comply with constitutional principles. By blocking the enforcement of the orders, the court preserved access to gender-affirming care for transgender minors and prevented further harm to their well-being. This case highlights the ongoing legal battles over LGBTQ+ rights and the limits of executive authority in shaping healthcare policy.
Dellinger v. Bessent (DDC 3/1/2025)
Judge Amy Berman Jackson (D. Obama)
What it’s about:
Dellinger involved the termination of Hampton Dellinger, the Special Counsel of the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), by President Trump. Dellinger argued that his termination violated 5 U.S.C. § 1211(b), which allows the President to remove the Special Counsel only for specific reasons (inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance).
Outcome and Injunction Analysis:
Judge Jackson granted Dellinger’s motion for summary judgment and permanent injunction, declaring his termination unlawful and reinstating him as Special Counsel. The court found that the termination violated § 1211(b) and that the removal restrictions were constitutional, as they did not unduly interfere with the President’s Article II powers. The injunction underscores the importance of protecting the independence of agencies tasked with safeguarding whistleblowers and ensuring merit-based civil service practices. By reinstating Dellinger, the court preserved the integrity of the OSC and its mission to protect federal employees from retaliation. This case highlights the ongoing tension between executive authority and congressional oversight in the federal civil service system.
Small Business Association of Michigan v. Yellen (WDMI 3/3/2025)
Judge Robert Jonker (R. G.W. Bush)
What it’s about:
The SBA case involved a constitutional challenge to the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA), which requires small businesses to report beneficial ownership information to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). Plaintiffs argued that the CTA’s reporting requirements violated the Fourth Amendment as an unreasonable search.
Outcome and Injunction Analysis:
Judge Jonker ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the CTA’s reporting requirements constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of the CTA’s reporting requirements against the plaintiffs and their members. The court found that the CTA’s broad, suspicionless collection of data for future law enforcement use violated the Fourth Amendment. The injunction reflects the judiciary’s role in protecting privacy rights and limiting government overreach in data collection. By blocking the enforcement of the CTA, the court safeguarded the privacy interests of small business owners and prevented the creation of a centralized database accessible to law enforcement. This case highlights the ongoing debate over the balance between national security and individual privacy in the digital age.
Splits
Duncan v. Bonta (CA9)
What it’s about:
The recent Duncan case involves a constitutional challenge to California’s ban on large-capacity magazines (LCMs) under the Second Amendment. Plaintiffs argue that the ban violates their right to bear arms, while California defends the law as a reasonable regulation to promote public safety. The case has gone through multiple rounds of litigation, including a prior en banc decision by the Ninth Circuit, a remand from the U.S. Supreme Court following its decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022), and a subsequent appeal after the district court again struck down the ban under Bruen. Here the court upheld the California ban. The current appeal raises questions about the statutory authority of the en banc court to decide the case, particularly whether senior judges who were active when the case was first heard en banc can continue to participate after taking senior status.
Decision Regarding Split:
The en banc court held that it has statutory authority to decide the case, even though some judges on the panel have since taken senior status. The court concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) allows senior judges to continue participating in the decision of a case or controversy that was heard or reheard by the en banc court while they were in regular active service. The court also determined that the current appeal is part of the same “case or controversy” as the prior en banc proceedings, meaning the en banc court retains jurisdiction.
Circuit Split:
The case reveals a circuit split on the interpretation of § 46(c), particularly regarding the participation of senior judges in en banc decisions after they take senior status. The key circuits involved are:
- Fifth Circuit: In United States v. Cocke (1968), the Fifth Circuit held that a judge who took senior status after en banc argument could still participate in the en banc decision, emphasizing judicial efficiency and the work already invested by the judge.
- Seventh Circuit: In United States v. Hudspeth (1994), the Seventh Circuit took a stricter approach, holding that senior judges could not participate in en banc decisions unless they were part of the original panel. This decision prompted Congress to amend § 46(c) in 1996 to allow senior judges to continue participating in en banc decisions if they were active when the case was first heard.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Duncan v. Bonta aligns more closely with the Fifth Circuit’s approach, allowing senior judges to continue participating in en banc decisions as long as they were active when the case was first heard. However, the Ninth Circuit’s decision has been criticized for extending this principle to new appeals following a remand, which some argue goes beyond the statutory text of § 46(c). This split highlights the tension between judicial efficiency and the statutory limits on senior judge participation in en banc decisions and may eventually require resolution by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Yukutake v. Lopez (CA9)
What it’s about:
This case involves a challenge to two provisions of Hawaii’s firearms laws by plaintiffs Todd Yukutake and David Kikukawa, who argue that these provisions violate the Second Amendment, as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The challenged provisions are:
- Hawaii Revised Statutes § 134-2(e): This provision requires that permits to acquire handguns must be used within a specific time frame (originally 10 days, now 30 days) or they become void.
- Hawaii Revised Statutes § 134-3: This provision requires gun owners to physically bring their firearms to a police station for inspection within five days of acquisition as part of the registration process.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, ruling that both provisions were facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and permanently enjoining their enforcement. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision.
Circuit Split:
The case touches on a potential circuit split regarding how courts should evaluate Second Amendment challenges, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bruen. Bruen rejected the two-step framework previously used by lower courts (which combined historical analysis with means-end scrutiny) and instead mandated a text-and-history-based approach. Under Bruen, if the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the regulated conduct, the government must justify the regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
The split arises from how different circuits interpret and apply Bruen‘s historical tradition test, particularly in cases involving modern firearm regulations that have no direct historical analogues. For example:
- Fifth Circuit: In McRorey v. Garland (2024), the Fifth Circuit upheld a federal background check requirement, finding it presumptively lawful and not subject to Bruen‘s historical test unless it was shown to be “abusive.”
- Tenth Circuit: In Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis (2024), the Tenth Circuit upheld a law prohibiting firearm sales to individuals under 21, applying Bruen‘s historical framework but finding the regulation consistent with historical traditions.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Yukutake v. Lopez contributes to this split by striking down Hawaii’s time-limited permit and in-person inspection requirements, finding no historical tradition supporting such regulations. This contrasts with other circuits that have upheld similar modern regulations under Bruen’s framework.
United States v. Black (CA7)
What it’s about:
This case involves Eural Black, a federal prisoner serving a 40-year sentence (30 years from stacked § 924(c) convictions). He sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that the First Step Act’s anti-stacking amendment to § 924(c) (which limits consecutive 25-year sentences for multiple § 924(c) convictions) constituted an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for a sentence reduction. However, Congress made this amendment non-retroactive, meaning it applies only to sentences not yet imposed at the time of enactment.
Circuit Split:
The circuit split revolves around whether the First Step Act’s anti-stacking amendment can be considered an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A), despite Congress’s explicit decision to make the amendment non-retroactive.
- Circuits Aligning with Thacker: The Seventh Circuit (in United States v. Thacker, 2021) and the Third Circuit (in United States v. Rutherford, 2024) hold that the anti-stacking amendment cannot constitute an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release because doing so would effectively make the amendment retroactive, contrary to Congress’s intent.
- Circuits Allowing the Amendment to Be Considered: The Ninth Circuit (in United States v. Chen, 2022) initially allowed the anti-stacking amendment to be considered for compassionate release, finding that the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement was consistent with the First Step Act and did not violate its non-retroactivity provision. However, the Fifth Circuit (in United States v. Austin, 2025) later overruled its earlier decision in Jean (2024) and aligned with Thacker.
This split creates inconsistent outcomes for prisoners seeking compassionate release based on the anti-stacking amendment, depending on the circuit in which they are located. It highlights the tension between judicial interpretations of statutory provisions and the Sentencing Commission’s authority to issue policy statements and may require Supreme Court intervention to resolve.
Sullivan v. Feldman (CA5)
What it’s about:
This case involves a complex dispute between doctors Scott Sullivan and Frank DellaCroce (and their related business entities) and Stewart Feldman, the Feldman Law Firm, and the Capstone Parties over alleged malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion of funds. The dispute arose from an Engagement Letter that included an arbitration provision requiring disputes to be resolved through arbitration under the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules.
Circuit Split:
The case highlights a circuit split over whether the incorporation of arbitration rules (such as the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules) into an arbitration agreement constitutes “clear and unmistakable evidence” that the parties intended to delegate the issue of class arbitrability to the arbitrator.
- Circuits Holding that Incorporation Delegates Class Arbitrability: The Second, Tenth, Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits hold that incorporation of arbitration rules is sufficient to delegate class arbitrability to the arbitrator. For example, the Second Circuit in Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC v. Sappington (2018) found that incorporation of the AAA Rules clearly and unmistakably delegates class arbitrability.
- Circuits Requiring Explicit Language: The Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits require more explicit language in the arbitration agreement itself to show intent to delegate class arbitrability. For example, the Third Circuit in Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Scout Petroleum, L.L.C. (2016) held that incorporation of the AAA Rules is insufficient to delegate class arbitrability.
This split creates inconsistent outcomes for parties seeking to arbitrate class-wide claims and raises questions about the scope of arbitration agreements and the extent to which courts should defer to arbitrators on gateway issues like class arbitrability. The split may eventually require Supreme Court intervention to resolve.
Clark v. Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government (CA6)
What it’s about:
Clark revolves around a wrongful conviction and subsequent civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In 1995, Garr Keith Hardin and Jeffrey Clark were convicted of murdering Rhonda Sue Warford in Kentucky. A key piece of evidence at trial was the testimony of forensic serologist Robert Thurman, who claimed that a hair found at the crime scene was “similar” to Hardin’s hair. Decades later, DNA testing proved the hair did not belong to Hardin, leading to the vacating of their convictions. Hardin and Clark then sued Thurman and others, alleging that Thurman violated their due process rights under Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose his observation notes, which suggested the hair might not have matched Hardin’s.
Circuit Split:
The case touches on a circuit split regarding whether Brady‘s disclosure obligations extend to forensic scientists and whether an intent requirement (e.g., bad faith) applies to such claims under § 1983.
- Sixth Circuit: In Moldowan v. City of Warren, the Sixth Circuit held that Brady‘s disclosure obligations extend to law enforcement officers, including forensic scientists, and that no bad faith is required if the exculpatory value of the evidence is “apparent.”
- Other Circuits: The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits require plaintiffs to show bad faith or recklessness for Brady-like claims against law enforcement. The Ninth Circuit has adopted a recklessness standard.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Clark aligns with its precedent in Moldowan, rejecting Thurman’s qualified immunity defense and affirming that Brady‘s disclosure obligations clearly applied to forensic scientists by the mid-1990s. This split highlights the differing approaches to Brady claims against law enforcement and forensic scientists across the circuits.
Day v. Henry (CA9)
What it’s about:
Day involves a challenge to Arizona’s alcohol regulatory scheme, which requires retailers to have a physical presence in the state to ship wine directly to consumers. Plaintiffs, Arizona residents, argued that this requirement discriminates against out-of-state retailers in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. The Ninth Circuit upheld Arizona’s law, finding it non-discriminatory because it applies equally to in-state and out-of-state retailers. The court did not reach the question of whether the law could be justified under the Twenty-first Amendment because it found no discrimination.
Circuit Split:
There is a circuit split on whether physical presence requirements for alcohol retailers violate the dormant Commerce Clause and how such laws should be analyzed under the Twenty-first Amendment.
- Ninth and Eighth Circuits: Physical presence requirements are not discriminatory if they apply equally to in-state and out-of-state retailers and are essential to the three-tier system.
- Fourth, Sixth, and First Circuits: Physical presence requirements are discriminatory but may be justified under the Twenty-first Amendment if they serve legitimate public health or safety interests and nondiscriminatory alternatives are insufficient.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Day v. Henry aligns with its deferential approach to the three-tier system, while other circuits require concrete evidence that such requirements serve legitimate state interests. This split centers on whether physical presence requirements inherently discriminate against out-of-state retailers and how courts should analyze their justification under the Twenty-first Amendment.
Houston v. Davis
What it’s about:
Houston v. Davis involves Cardell Houston’s appeal of the district court’s denial of his habeas corpus petition. Houston was convicted of two counts of murder and two counts of felonious assault in Ohio state court, and his habeas petition was dismissed as untimely under AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. He attempted to bypass the procedural bar by asserting actual innocence under Schlup v. Delo, but the court found that his new evidence—an expert’s declaration regarding potential flaws in DNA analysis—was insufficient to meet the Schlup standard.
Circuit Split:
There is a circuit split on what qualifies as “new” evidence under the Schlup gateway.
- More Restrictive View: Some courts, such as the Seventh Circuit, hold that evidence must be newly discovered, meaning it could not have been obtained at the time of trial with reasonable diligence.
- More Expansive View: The Sixth Circuit has acknowledged this split but has not definitively resolved it. Some of its cases suggest that newly presented evidence (even if available at trial but not used) may suffice under Schlup, while others require the evidence to be newly discovered.
This split creates uncertainty for habeas petitioners seeking to assert actual innocence as a gateway to bypass procedural bars, and it may require Supreme Court intervention to clarify the standard for “new” evidence under Schlup.
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Adam Feldman runs the litigation consulting company Optimized Legal Solutions LLC. Check out more of his writing at Legalytics and Empirical SCOTUS. For more information, write Adam at adam@feldmannet.com. Find him on Twitter: @AdamSFeldman.
The post Injunction Junction And Circuit Splits Too appeared first on Above the Law.
What do five Biden, two Obama, one George W. Bush, one Trump judicial appointee to the district courts have in common? If you guessed that they all issued significant injunctions, many at the national level in the last several weeks then you answered correctly. This post details the issues in the cases along with the scopes of the injunctions. It then delves into federal appeals opinions that in some way explicitly signaled a circuit split. Before jumping into the cases though here is a breakdown of current federal district court judges by party of appointing president (data from fjc.gov).
The split is approximately 54% Democratic to 46% Republican. When broken down by appointing president when senior judges are removed the balance is as follows:
These statistics are helpful in thinking about the district court judges who issued these injunctions and helps inform role politics may play not only in creating the policies that led to these cases, but potentially in the case dispositions as well. While these cases occur in a specific period of time, this relationship between judge and president is not static. Instead it works in both directions depending on the party of the active president and the party judge’s appointing president. Now for a look at each of the matters.
Judge Ana Reyes (D. Biden)
What it’s about:
Talbott involves a legal challenge to President Donald Trump’s Executive Order 14183, which banned transgender individuals from serving in the U.S. military. The plaintiffs—active-duty transgender service members and enlistment candidates—argued that the policy violated their Fifth Amendment equal protection rights by discriminating against them based on sex and transgender status. They contended that the ban was rooted in animus, lacked a rational basis, and ignored evidence showing that transgender individuals could serve effectively. The government defended the policy by citing concerns about military readiness, unit cohesion, and costs, but the court found these justifications unsupported by credible evidence.
Outcome and Injunction:
Judge Reyes granted a preliminary injunction, blocking enforcement of the ban and maintaining the pre-existing policy allowing transgender individuals to serve openly. The injunction applies nationwide, preventing the military from discharging transgender service members or denying enlistment based on gender identity. The ruling emphasized that the government’s justifications were conjectural and pretextual, while the plaintiffs demonstrated irreparable harm to their careers and constitutional rights. The court stayed the injunction briefly to allow for a potential appeal but affirmed that upholding equal protection outweighs the government’s speculative claims about military effectiveness.
Judge Julie R. Rubin (D. Biden)
What it’s about:
This case involved the termination of federal grants under the Teacher Quality Partnership Program (TQP), Supporting Effective Educator Development Program (SEED), and Teacher and School Leader Incentive Program (TSL). The U.S. Department of Education terminated these grants, which supported teacher preparation and professional development, particularly in underserved areas, citing a shift in priorities away from diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives under Executive Order 14151. Plaintiffs, including the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education (AACTE), argued that the terminations violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because the Department failed to follow proper notice-and-comment rulemaking and provided vague reasoning.
Outcome and Injunction:
Judge Rubin issued a nationwide preliminary injunction, reinstating the terminated grants and prohibiting the Department from further terminations without following proper procedures. The injunction applied to all TQP, SEED, and TSL grant recipients, ensuring that the Department could not terminate these grants in a manner likely to violate the APA. The court emphasized that the Department’s failure to provide adequate notice and reasoning for the terminations rendered its actions arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The abrupt termination of grants caused irreparable harm to teacher preparation programs and the students they serve, particularly in underserved areas. The injunction highlights the importance of procedural safeguards in federal grant administration and underscores the judiciary’s role in ensuring that agencies adhere to statutory requirements. By reinstating the grants, the court preserved critical funding for programs that address teacher shortages and improve educational outcomes in disadvantaged communities.
Judge James K. Bredar (D. Obama)
What it’s about:
This case arose from the federal government’s termination of thousands of probationary employees across multiple agencies in February 2025. Plaintiffs, including 19 states and the District of Columbia, argued that the terminations were illegal reductions in force (RIFs) conducted without the required 60-day notice to states, violating the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The terminations caused significant harm to states, including overwhelming unemployment systems and disrupting essential services.
Outcome and Injunction Analysis:
Judge Bredar granted a nationwide Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), reinstating the terminated employees and prohibiting further RIFs without proper notice. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits and that the states would suffer irreparable harm without the TRO. The court reasoned that the federal government’s failure to provide the required notice violated the APA and caused immediate harm to state unemployment systems and public services. The TRO not only reinstated the terminated employees but also prevented further disruptions to state operations. The nationwide scope of the injunction was necessary because the federal government’s actions were based on a uniform policy affecting all agencies and states. This case underscores the importance of procedural compliance in federal workforce reductions and the judiciary’s role in mitigating harm to state governments and their citizens.
Judge Roy Altman (R. Trump)
What it’s about:
In this case the Farmworker Association challenged Section 10 of Florida’s SB 1718, which regulates the transportation of individuals who have entered the U.S. unlawfully. Plaintiffs, including the Farmworker Association of Florida (FWAF), argued that the state law was preempted by federal immigration law. The court granted a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of Section 10 but limited the injunction to the named plaintiffs and FWAF members.
Outcome and Injunction Analysis:
The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their preemption claim but declined to issue a statewide injunction, limiting relief to the individual plaintiffs and FWAF members. The court emphasized that equitable relief should be limited to parties who demonstrated standing. The injunction reflects the court’s cautious approach to balancing state and federal authority in immigration enforcement. By limiting the scope of the injunction, the court avoided a broader conflict with state sovereignty while still providing relief to the plaintiffs. This case highlights the ongoing tension between state immigration laws and federal preemption, as well as the judiciary’s role in navigating these complex legal issues.
Judge Adam B. Abelson (D. Biden)
What it’s about:
This case involved a challenge to Executive Orders J20 and J21, which imposed restrictions on federal grants, contracts, and enforcement actions related to DEI programs. Plaintiffs argued that the orders violated the First Amendment (free speech) and the Fifth Amendment (due process).
Outcome and Injunction Analysis:
Judge Abelson granted a nationwide preliminary injunction, blocking enforcement of specific provisions of the orders. The injunction applied to all federal executive branch agencies, departments, and commissions directed by the orders. The court found that the orders were likely unconstitutional because they imposed content-based restrictions on speech and were unconstitutionally vague. The injunction underscores the judiciary’s role in protecting free speech and preventing government overreach in regulating DEI initiatives. By blocking the enforcement of the orders, the court preserved the ability of organizations to engage in DEI-related activities without fear of retaliation or loss of funding. This case highlights the broader debate over the role of DEI in public institutions and the limits of executive authority in shaping policy.
Judge Angel Kelley (D. Biden)
What it’s about:
The NIH case deals with a Supplemental Guidance issued by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), which imposed a 15% cap on indirect cost rates for all NIH grants. Plaintiffs, including 22 state attorneys general and medical associations, argued that the cap violated federal law and threatened to disrupt biomedical research and public health initiatives.
Outcome and Injunction Analysis:
Judge Kelley granted a nationwide preliminary injunction, blocking enforcement of the Rate Change Notice. The injunction applied to all NIH grant recipients, not just the named plaintiffs. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claims and that the Rate Change Notice would cause irreparable harm to biomedical research and public health. The court emphasized that the NIH’s failure to follow proper procedures and consider the reliance interests of grant recipients rendered the Rate Change Notice arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The injunction preserves critical funding for research institutions and ensures the continuity of life-saving clinical trials and public health initiatives. This case highlights the importance of procedural compliance in federal rulemaking and the judiciary’s role in safeguarding public health and scientific research.
Judge Brendan A. Hurson (D. Biden)
What it’s about:
PFLAG challenged Executive Orders 14,168 (Gender Identity Order) and 14,187 (Healthcare Order), which conditioned federal funding on the denial of gender-affirming medical care for individuals under 19. Plaintiffs, including transgender minors and advocacy organizations, argued that the orders violated the separation of powers, conflicted with existing statutes, and infringed on equal protection rights.
Outcome and Injunction Analysis:
Judge Hurson granted a nationwide preliminary injunction, blocking enforcement of the challenged provisions. The injunction applied to all federal executive branch agencies. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claims and that the orders violated the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection clause. The injunction underscores the judiciary’s role in protecting the rights of marginalized communities and ensuring that federal policies comply with constitutional principles. By blocking the enforcement of the orders, the court preserved access to gender-affirming care for transgender minors and prevented further harm to their well-being. This case highlights the ongoing legal battles over LGBTQ+ rights and the limits of executive authority in shaping healthcare policy.
Judge Amy Berman Jackson (D. Obama)
What it’s about:
Dellinger involved the termination of Hampton Dellinger, the Special Counsel of the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), by President Trump. Dellinger argued that his termination violated 5 U.S.C. § 1211(b), which allows the President to remove the Special Counsel only for specific reasons (inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance).
Outcome and Injunction Analysis:
Judge Jackson granted Dellinger’s motion for summary judgment and permanent injunction, declaring his termination unlawful and reinstating him as Special Counsel. The court found that the termination violated § 1211(b) and that the removal restrictions were constitutional, as they did not unduly interfere with the President’s Article II powers. The injunction underscores the importance of protecting the independence of agencies tasked with safeguarding whistleblowers and ensuring merit-based civil service practices. By reinstating Dellinger, the court preserved the integrity of the OSC and its mission to protect federal employees from retaliation. This case highlights the ongoing tension between executive authority and congressional oversight in the federal civil service system.
Judge Robert Jonker (R. G.W. Bush)
What it’s about:
The SBA case involved a constitutional challenge to the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA), which requires small businesses to report beneficial ownership information to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). Plaintiffs argued that the CTA’s reporting requirements violated the Fourth Amendment as an unreasonable search.
Outcome and Injunction Analysis:
Judge Jonker ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the CTA’s reporting requirements constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of the CTA’s reporting requirements against the plaintiffs and their members. The court found that the CTA’s broad, suspicionless collection of data for future law enforcement use violated the Fourth Amendment. The injunction reflects the judiciary’s role in protecting privacy rights and limiting government overreach in data collection. By blocking the enforcement of the CTA, the court safeguarded the privacy interests of small business owners and prevented the creation of a centralized database accessible to law enforcement. This case highlights the ongoing debate over the balance between national security and individual privacy in the digital age.
What it’s about:
The recent Duncan case involves a constitutional challenge to California’s ban on large-capacity magazines (LCMs) under the Second Amendment. Plaintiffs argue that the ban violates their right to bear arms, while California defends the law as a reasonable regulation to promote public safety. The case has gone through multiple rounds of litigation, including a prior en banc decision by the Ninth Circuit, a remand from the U.S. Supreme Court following its decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022), and a subsequent appeal after the district court again struck down the ban under Bruen. Here the court upheld the California ban. The current appeal raises questions about the statutory authority of the en banc court to decide the case, particularly whether senior judges who were active when the case was first heard en banc can continue to participate after taking senior status.
Decision Regarding Split:
The en banc court held that it has statutory authority to decide the case, even though some judges on the panel have since taken senior status. The court concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) allows senior judges to continue participating in the decision of a case or controversy that was heard or reheard by the en banc court while they were in regular active service. The court also determined that the current appeal is part of the same “case or controversy” as the prior en banc proceedings, meaning the en banc court retains jurisdiction.
Circuit Split:
The case reveals a circuit split on the interpretation of § 46(c), particularly regarding the participation of senior judges in en banc decisions after they take senior status. The key circuits involved are:
- Fifth Circuit: In United States v. Cocke (1968), the Fifth Circuit held that a judge who took senior status after en banc argument could still participate in the en banc decision, emphasizing judicial efficiency and the work already invested by the judge.
- Seventh Circuit: In United States v. Hudspeth (1994), the Seventh Circuit took a stricter approach, holding that senior judges could not participate in en banc decisions unless they were part of the original panel. This decision prompted Congress to amend § 46(c) in 1996 to allow senior judges to continue participating in en banc decisions if they were active when the case was first heard.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Duncan v. Bonta aligns more closely with the Fifth Circuit’s approach, allowing senior judges to continue participating in en banc decisions as long as they were active when the case was first heard. However, the Ninth Circuit’s decision has been criticized for extending this principle to new appeals following a remand, which some argue goes beyond the statutory text of § 46(c). This split highlights the tension between judicial efficiency and the statutory limits on senior judge participation in en banc decisions and may eventually require resolution by the U.S. Supreme Court.
What it’s about:
This case involves a challenge to two provisions of Hawaii’s firearms laws by plaintiffs Todd Yukutake and David Kikukawa, who argue that these provisions violate the Second Amendment, as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The challenged provisions are:
- Hawaii Revised Statutes § 134-2(e): This provision requires that permits to acquire handguns must be used within a specific time frame (originally 10 days, now 30 days) or they become void.
- Hawaii Revised Statutes § 134-3: This provision requires gun owners to physically bring their firearms to a police station for inspection within five days of acquisition as part of the registration process.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, ruling that both provisions were facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and permanently enjoining their enforcement. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision.
Circuit Split:
The case touches on a potential circuit split regarding how courts should evaluate Second Amendment challenges, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bruen. Bruen rejected the two-step framework previously used by lower courts (which combined historical analysis with means-end scrutiny) and instead mandated a text-and-history-based approach. Under Bruen, if the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the regulated conduct, the government must justify the regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
The split arises from how different circuits interpret and apply Bruen‘s historical tradition test, particularly in cases involving modern firearm regulations that have no direct historical analogues. For example:
- Fifth Circuit: In McRorey v. Garland (2024), the Fifth Circuit upheld a federal background check requirement, finding it presumptively lawful and not subject to Bruen‘s historical test unless it was shown to be “abusive.”
- Tenth Circuit: In Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis (2024), the Tenth Circuit upheld a law prohibiting firearm sales to individuals under 21, applying Bruen‘s historical framework but finding the regulation consistent with historical traditions.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Yukutake v. Lopez contributes to this split by striking down Hawaii’s time-limited permit and in-person inspection requirements, finding no historical tradition supporting such regulations. This contrasts with other circuits that have upheld similar modern regulations under Bruen’s framework.
What it’s about:
This case involves Eural Black, a federal prisoner serving a 40-year sentence (30 years from stacked § 924(c) convictions). He sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that the First Step Act’s anti-stacking amendment to § 924(c) (which limits consecutive 25-year sentences for multiple § 924(c) convictions) constituted an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for a sentence reduction. However, Congress made this amendment non-retroactive, meaning it applies only to sentences not yet imposed at the time of enactment.
Circuit Split:
The circuit split revolves around whether the First Step Act’s anti-stacking amendment can be considered an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A), despite Congress’s explicit decision to make the amendment non-retroactive.
- Circuits Aligning with Thacker: The Seventh Circuit (in United States v. Thacker, 2021) and the Third Circuit (in United States v. Rutherford, 2024) hold that the anti-stacking amendment cannot constitute an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release because doing so would effectively make the amendment retroactive, contrary to Congress’s intent.
- Circuits Allowing the Amendment to Be Considered: The Ninth Circuit (in United States v. Chen, 2022) initially allowed the anti-stacking amendment to be considered for compassionate release, finding that the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement was consistent with the First Step Act and did not violate its non-retroactivity provision. However, the Fifth Circuit (in United States v. Austin, 2025) later overruled its earlier decision in Jean (2024) and aligned with Thacker.
This split creates inconsistent outcomes for prisoners seeking compassionate release based on the anti-stacking amendment, depending on the circuit in which they are located. It highlights the tension between judicial interpretations of statutory provisions and the Sentencing Commission’s authority to issue policy statements and may require Supreme Court intervention to resolve.
What it’s about:
This case involves a complex dispute between doctors Scott Sullivan and Frank DellaCroce (and their related business entities) and Stewart Feldman, the Feldman Law Firm, and the Capstone Parties over alleged malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion of funds. The dispute arose from an Engagement Letter that included an arbitration provision requiring disputes to be resolved through arbitration under the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules.
Circuit Split:
The case highlights a circuit split over whether the incorporation of arbitration rules (such as the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules) into an arbitration agreement constitutes “clear and unmistakable evidence” that the parties intended to delegate the issue of class arbitrability to the arbitrator.
- Circuits Holding that Incorporation Delegates Class Arbitrability: The Second, Tenth, Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits hold that incorporation of arbitration rules is sufficient to delegate class arbitrability to the arbitrator. For example, the Second Circuit in Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC v. Sappington (2018) found that incorporation of the AAA Rules clearly and unmistakably delegates class arbitrability.
- Circuits Requiring Explicit Language: The Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits require more explicit language in the arbitration agreement itself to show intent to delegate class arbitrability. For example, the Third Circuit in Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Scout Petroleum, L.L.C. (2016) held that incorporation of the AAA Rules is insufficient to delegate class arbitrability.
This split creates inconsistent outcomes for parties seeking to arbitrate class-wide claims and raises questions about the scope of arbitration agreements and the extent to which courts should defer to arbitrators on gateway issues like class arbitrability. The split may eventually require Supreme Court intervention to resolve.
What it’s about:
Clark revolves around a wrongful conviction and subsequent civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In 1995, Garr Keith Hardin and Jeffrey Clark were convicted of murdering Rhonda Sue Warford in Kentucky. A key piece of evidence at trial was the testimony of forensic serologist Robert Thurman, who claimed that a hair found at the crime scene was “similar” to Hardin’s hair. Decades later, DNA testing proved the hair did not belong to Hardin, leading to the vacating of their convictions. Hardin and Clark then sued Thurman and others, alleging that Thurman violated their due process rights under Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose his observation notes, which suggested the hair might not have matched Hardin’s.
Circuit Split:
The case touches on a circuit split regarding whether Brady‘s disclosure obligations extend to forensic scientists and whether an intent requirement (e.g., bad faith) applies to such claims under § 1983.
- Sixth Circuit: In Moldowan v. City of Warren, the Sixth Circuit held that Brady‘s disclosure obligations extend to law enforcement officers, including forensic scientists, and that no bad faith is required if the exculpatory value of the evidence is “apparent.”
- Other Circuits: The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits require plaintiffs to show bad faith or recklessness for Brady-like claims against law enforcement. The Ninth Circuit has adopted a recklessness standard.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Clark aligns with its precedent in Moldowan, rejecting Thurman’s qualified immunity defense and affirming that Brady‘s disclosure obligations clearly applied to forensic scientists by the mid-1990s. This split highlights the differing approaches to Brady claims against law enforcement and forensic scientists across the circuits.
What it’s about:
Day involves a challenge to Arizona’s alcohol regulatory scheme, which requires retailers to have a physical presence in the state to ship wine directly to consumers. Plaintiffs, Arizona residents, argued that this requirement discriminates against out-of-state retailers in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. The Ninth Circuit upheld Arizona’s law, finding it non-discriminatory because it applies equally to in-state and out-of-state retailers. The court did not reach the question of whether the law could be justified under the Twenty-first Amendment because it found no discrimination.
Circuit Split:
There is a circuit split on whether physical presence requirements for alcohol retailers violate the dormant Commerce Clause and how such laws should be analyzed under the Twenty-first Amendment.
- Ninth and Eighth Circuits: Physical presence requirements are not discriminatory if they apply equally to in-state and out-of-state retailers and are essential to the three-tier system.
- Fourth, Sixth, and First Circuits: Physical presence requirements are discriminatory but may be justified under the Twenty-first Amendment if they serve legitimate public health or safety interests and nondiscriminatory alternatives are insufficient.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Day v. Henry aligns with its deferential approach to the three-tier system, while other circuits require concrete evidence that such requirements serve legitimate state interests. This split centers on whether physical presence requirements inherently discriminate against out-of-state retailers and how courts should analyze their justification under the Twenty-first Amendment.
What it’s about:
Houston v. Davis involves Cardell Houston’s appeal of the district court’s denial of his habeas corpus petition. Houston was convicted of two counts of murder and two counts of felonious assault in Ohio state court, and his habeas petition was dismissed as untimely under AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. He attempted to bypass the procedural bar by asserting actual innocence under Schlup v. Delo, but the court found that his new evidence—an expert’s declaration regarding potential flaws in DNA analysis—was insufficient to meet the Schlup standard.
Circuit Split:
There is a circuit split on what qualifies as “new” evidence under the Schlup gateway.
- More Restrictive View: Some courts, such as the Seventh Circuit, hold that evidence must be newly discovered, meaning it could not have been obtained at the time of trial with reasonable diligence.
- More Expansive View: The Sixth Circuit has acknowledged this split but has not definitively resolved it. Some of its cases suggest that newly presented evidence (even if available at trial but not used) may suffice under Schlup, while others require the evidence to be newly discovered.
This split creates uncertainty for habeas petitioners seeking to assert actual innocence as a gateway to bypass procedural bars, and it may require Supreme Court intervention to clarify the standard for “new” evidence under Schlup.
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Adam Feldman runs the litigation consulting company Optimized Legal Solutions LLC. Check out more of his writing at Legalytics and Empirical SCOTUS. For more information, write Adam at [email protected]. Find him on Twitter: @AdamSFeldman.
